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I. INTRODUCTION
In our civilized America, the incidence of crime and violence
committed against our fellow citizens simply on account of their race,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation' has been increasing at an
alarming rate. Statistics gathered by the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force reported a sixty percent increase in crime motivated by
sexual orientation between the years 1985 and 1986.2 The American
Jewish Congress (AJC), in a 1987 report, noted that the incidence of
violence against Jews has dramatically increased.3 The United States
Congress responded to the growing concern over the rising incidence
of hate crime by passing the Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990.'
The Hate Crimes Statistics Act represents a nationwide effort to
compile statistics in an attempt to ascertain the prevalence of hate
crimes in America.5 On January 4, 1993, the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation released its first full report pursuant to this act.6 The results
show that out of 4,755 hate crimes reported over sixty-two percent
1. These are just a few of the bases for committing what is termed a "hate crime."
As used in the proposed Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1992, H.R. 4797,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), a hate crime is "a crime in which the defendant's conduct
[is] motivated by hatred, bias, or prejudice, based on the actual or perceived race, color,
religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation of another individual or
group of individuals."
2. U.S. House Votes Landslide Victory for Gays, Lesbians on Hate Crimes Bill,
PRNewswire, May 19, 1988, available in WESTLAW, NEWS-ASAP Database.
3. AJCongress Hails House Passage of Hate Crimes Statistics Act, PRNewswire, May
18, 1988, available in WESTLAW, NEWS-ASAP Database.
4. The Hate Crimes Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1992).
5. 60 Percent of Hate Crimes Tied to Race, Cm. TRM., Jan. 5, 1993, at 6.
6. The Hate Crimes Statistics Act delegated the duty to collect data on hate crimes
to the FBI because of its expertise in gathering crime statistics.
7. "Reported" is emphasized here because many incidents are simply never reported
to law enforcement authorities. Also, participation with data collection by police and law
enforcement agencies across the nation is presently voluntary under the Act. Thus, only
2,771 law enforcement agencies took part in the study out of a possible 16,000 agencies
that annually report crime statistics to the FBI for its Uniform Crime Reports. See Jerry
Seper, Data Hailed as First Step in Fighting Bias Offenses, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at
A3.
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were racially motivated.' Out of these, anti-black sentiment resulted in
an astounding 1,689 incidents.9
While the most prevalent hate crime was intimidation,"° hate
crimes may occur in many different forms and contexts. They range
from the most violent crimes, such as physical abuse and murder, to
literally obnoxious and provocative verbal insults." For example, a
twenty-seven year old homosexual from Vermont was placed into a
coma when his head was beaten to a bloody pulp outside a gay bar."
His attacker admitted targeting him because he was a "fag." 3 In a
less violent occurrence, an African American family was forced to
leave their new home because of race motivated harassment. 4 Within
one week after moving in, hate mongers had thrown rocks through
their windows, set their porch afire with gasoline, shattered their front
door, and harassed them with threatening phone calls and hate mail.15
Despite the character or magnitude of these or any hate crime, hate
crimes in general have the effect of polarizing our society by inciting
hate, suspicion, distrust, and prejudice. Consequently, forty-six states 6
and over two-hundred colleges and universities 7 throughout the na-
tion have enacted laws aimed at battling such antisocial behavior.
8. 60 Percent of Hate Crimes Tied to Race, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1993, at 6.
9. Id. In comparison, 888 were caused by anti-white feelings. See id,
10. Intimidation accounted for 1,614 incidents, or 33.9% of the total reported. See
Seper, supra note 7, at A3.
11. According to the FBI report, out of the 4,755 hate crimes committed in 1991, 773
were aggravated assaults, 796 were simple assaults, 12 people lost their lives and 7 were
forcibly raped. In addition, there were 1,301 incidents of vandalism. Finally, there were also
a few incidents of burglary, larceny, theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson, each accounting
for less than one percent of the total. See Seper, supra note 7, at A3.
12. Rorie Sherman, Hate Crimes Statutes Abound; Newest, in VT Among the Tough-
est, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1990, at 3.
13. Id.
14. 138 CONG. REC. S8317 (daily ed. June 16, 1992) (statement of Sen. Simon).
15. Id.
16. David G. Savage, Hate Crime Law is Struck Down; Supreme Court: Justices Rule
that a Minnesota Statute Infringes on Free Speech by Punishing Those Who Burn Crosses,
Paint Swastikas or Otherwise Display Bigotry, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1992, at Al. The only
states that have not enacted some form of hate crime law to date are Utah, Wyoming,
Nebraska, and Alaska. Justices Declare "Hate Crime" Laws Unconstitutional, N.Y. L.J.,
June 23, 1992, at 1.
17. Savage, supra note 16, at Al.
1992-93]
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Hate-crime laws, while certainly well-intentioned, present special
problems to a society based on liberty and equality of rights. Justice
Jackson best articulated this in his widely cited passage from West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette"8 :
Struggles to coerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end
thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many
good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenome-
non but at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial
security, support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving
souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent
on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severity. As gov-
ernmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so strife becomes more
bitter as to whose unity it shall be .... Those who begin coercive elimi-
nation of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dis,.enters. Compul-
sory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the
graveyard. 19
Within this competition between the individual rights of freedom of
speech and expression and society's interest in living free from bias
motivated crime, the United States Supreme Court decided R.A. V.v. St.
Paul. 20 In PKA.V., the Court held that although burning a cross in
someone's yard is repulsive behavior, the St. Paul statute banning such
behavior 1 presented a facially unconstitutional restriction on free ex-
pression.2
This Comment discusses the RA.V. case and the broad implica-
tions it may have on current law. First, it will discuss the First
Amendment principles used for deciding similar constitutional challeng-
es to free speech restrictions. Second, it will present an in depth analy-
18. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19. IL at 640.
20. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). While all the Justices agreed that the ordinance was
unconstitutional, their analysis and reasoning varied-greatly.
21. ST. PAUL MINN. LEn. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
22. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined. Justice White filed a blistering opinion
concurring in the judgment in which Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined. Justice
Stevens also joined, except as to Part I(A). Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in
the judgment only, in which Justices White and Blackmun joined as to Part I. Finally,
Justice Blackmaun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
[Vol. 95:561
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sis of the Court's majority opinion as well as a summary of the con-
currences. Finally, it will argue that the extreme breadth of the deci-
sion provides little guidance for future hate crime legislation and casts
doubt upon the validity of many similar laws enacted in almost every
state and university nationwide.
H-. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The City of St. Paul alleged that in the early morning hours of
June 21, 1990, Robert A. Viktora and several of his acquaintances
made a cross out of legs from an old chair.24 The group then placed
the cross within the fenced yard of an African American family's
home and set it on fire.25 Although St. Paul could have prosecuted
this conduct under several different laws,2 6 it chose to prosecute Mr.
Viktora for violating the City's Bias-Motivated Crime ordinance.2
This ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appel-
lation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning
cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to
know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.'
23. At the time of the commencement of the case, Robert A. Viktora was a juvenile.
Upon obtaining the age of 18, his name was released to the public. See James Walsh,
Cross Burning Victim, Suspect Discuss Feelings, THE STAR TRIBUNE, June 24, 1992, at 2B.
Viktora calls himself a "white separatist;" one that thinks that blacks and whites should live
apart. Id.
24. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2541 (1992).
25. Il
26. IL n.1 (citing MINN. STAT. § 609.713(1) (1987) (providing for up to five years in
prison for terroristic threats); MINN. STAT. § 609.563 (1987) (providing for up to five years
and a $10,000 fine for arson, depending on the value of the property to be damaged);
MINN. STAT. § 609.595 (Supp. 1992) (providing for up to one year in prison and a $3,000
fine for criminal damage to property, depending upon the extent of the damage to the prop-
erty)).
27. Id
28. Id (citing ST. PAUL, MINN. LEG. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
1992-931
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Mr. Viktora moved to dismiss this count arguing that the ordi-
nance was substantially overbroad and content-based.29 Therefore, it
clearly reached conduct and expression protected by the First Amend-
ment." The trial court agreed and granted his motion to dismiss.31
St. Paul appealed, arguing that the ordinance can be limited in its
interpretation to reach only conduct that is not constitutionally protect-
ed.32 Justice Tomljanovich, writing for the Minnesota Supreme Court
en banc, agreed.3  The state supreme court held that the phrase
"arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others" reached only fighting
words within the meaning established by Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire24 This placed the ordinance's proscribed expression beyond the
protective arm of the First Amendment.35 The court also concluded
that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally content-based because it
was "a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the compelling
governmental interest in protecting the community against bias-motivat-
ed threats to public safety and order. '36 The United States Supreme
Court ultimately granted certiorari 37 and overturned the state supreme
court's decision.38 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that
the ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it was
impermissibly content-based and not a necessary means of achieving
St. Paul's asserted compelling interest.3
29. Robert Viktora was also charged with committing racially motivated assaults under
MINN. STAT. § 609.2231(4) (Supp. 1990), but did not challenge this count. See RA.Y, 112
S. Ct. at 2541 & n.2.
30. Id
31. Id
32. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev'd sub nom. R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
33. In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d at 507.
34. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568
(1942)).
35. Id at 2541 (citing In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991)).
36. Id. For an analysis of the case at the state supreme court level, see Daniel W.
Homstad, Note, Of Burning Crosses and Chilled Expression: Minnesota and the Eighth
Circuit Moderate First Amendment Mandates in "Hate Speech" Prosecutions: In Re RA.V.
and United States v. Lee, 15 HAMLINE L. REv. 167 (1991).
37. 111 S. Ct. 2795 (1991).
38. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
39. Id at 2547-50.
[Vol. 95:561
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III. REvIEw AND BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
each individual with the right of freedom of speech as well as other
guarantees.' It has been argued that these First Amendment rights
enjoy a preferred position when compared to other constitutional rights
and guarantees." While other amendments do not appear to be as
strict in their terms,42 the First Amendment seemingly speaks in abso-
lute terms: "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech ... ."43 Nevertheless, the notion has evolved that the First
Amendment protections are not always absolute. This conflict has
produced an overwhelming amount of First Amendment theory and
structural development. 44
The First Amendment is less exact in what encompasses the right
of free "speech." On numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has
defined the terms "speech" and "expression" as constituting basically
the same right under the First Amendment. In RA. V., it is clear that
the Minnesota courts and the Supreme Court of the United States
accepted Robert Viktora's cross burning as a form of "symbolic ex-
pression."45 They therefore tested the constitutional validity of the St.
Paul ordinance by using First Amendment principles. To fully under-
stand the Supreme 'Court's analysis in R.A.V., it is necessary to ex-
amine the development of symbolic expression as a recognized form of
expression, as well as the evolution of the categories of permissible
40. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise of speech thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
41. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 20.7, at 18 (1986).
42. In comparison, the Fourth Amendment prohibits the state from conducting "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
44. Frederick Schauer, Categories of the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L. REV. 265, 266 n.5 (1981).
45. RZA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2541. See infra discussion at part II.A.
1992-931 567
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speech restrictions, and finally the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness
challenges to these First Amendment regulations.
A. The Development of Symbols as Speech: Nonverbal
Communication
In 1931, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that
speech may be nonverbal.46 In Stromberg v. California,47 the Su-
preme Court struck down a statute which prohibited the display of a
red flag "as a sign, symbol, or emblem of opposition to organized
government." 45 The Court ruled that the statute was so vague that it
allowed punishment for the fair use of "the opportunity for free politi-
cal discussion."49 Thirty-five years later, in Brown v. Louisiana,°
the Court reemphasized its position that the First Amendment right of
free speech included nonverbal expression. There, the Court found that
a peaceful sit-in at a segregated library was protected by the First
Amendment.51
While nonverbal, symbolic speech plays an important role in ev-
eryday life,52 the Court in United States v. O'Brien53 began to place
limits on what could be considered protected symbolic expression. The
case presented the issue of whether section 462(b) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 194854 was unconstitutional as
applied to O'Brien.55 The Court answered negatively and upheld
46. See ROTUNDA Er AL, supra note 41, § 20.48, at 262.
47. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
48. Id
49. L at 369 (emphasis added).
50. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
51. Justice Fortas wrote in his opinion, that First Amendment rights "are not confimed
to verbal expression [but] embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the
right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest . . . unconstitutional segregation of pub-
lic facilities." Brown, 383 U.S. at 142.
52. For example, waving good-bye, nodding one's head, or making obscene gestures.
53. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
54. This section of the Act punished those who burned or ,otherwise mutilated their
draft cards.
55. O'Brien burned his draft card to express his protest of the Vietnam War. There-
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O'Brien's conviction.56 It recognized that not all conduct can be la-
beled as expression simply because the actor intends to convey a mes-
sage.-5 The Court then devised a four-part test for deciding when a
content-neutral speech restriction58 is sufficiently justified by a gov-
ernmental interest to withstand a First Amendment challenge.59
Finally, in Spence v. Washington,6" the Court presented two
guidelines for deciding when particular conduct contained sufficient
expressive content to warrant free speech analysis. The court held that
symbols constitute a form of expression when: (1) the actor intends on
conveying a particular message, and (2) the likelihood is great that the
message will be understood by those viewing it.61 This rule is cur-
rently still used by the courts..
Most recently the Court has addressed the issue of whether burn-
ing the American Flag may be considered protected expression. In
United States v. Eichman,6 2 Eichman and several other defendants
burned the American flag in protest of American policies. They were
prosecuted for violating the Flag Protection Act of 1989 (Act).63 This
56. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382.
57. I& at 376.
58. I1& at 377. See infra note 69.
59. The Court articulated the following four factors:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
60. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (affixing a peace sign made from removable tape to one's
own American flag hanging in a private window is a form of speech).
61. Id. at 411.
62. 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (The case was a series of consolidated appeals).
63. Flag Protection Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 700 (Supp. 1990). Congress passed this
act as a result of strong public opposition to the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989). In Johnson, the Court overturned a flag burning conviction under a Texas
flag anti-desecration statute. This statute made it a crime to mistreat the American flag in a
way that would "seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover [the
act]." The Court held that Johnson was prosecuted solely for the expression of a particular
idea: his dissatisfaction with American policies. Concluding that the statute was content-
based, the Supreme Court used strict scrutiny analysis and found the Texas statute to be an
9
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Act criminalized a person's conduct if the person "knowingly muti-
late[d], deface[d], physically defile[d], burn[ed], maintain[ed] on the
floor or ground, or trample[d] upon" a United States flag. 6 However,
the Act permitted such conduct if the conduct was related to the dis-
posal of a "worn or soiled" flag.65 Congress purported that the Act
was content neutral since it targeted those who mistreated the flag
without reference to the actor's motive. However, the Supreme Court
found that the Act suffered from the same fatal flaw as the one pres-
ent in the Texas statute the Court found unconstitutional the year be-
fore: "[1]t suppresse[d] expression out of concern for its likely commu-
nicative impact." 66
In Eichman, the Court held that the government's asserted interest
in protecting the "physical integrity" of the flag as a national symbol
was directly related to the suppression of free expression. 67 It also
held that while the Act contained no explicit content-based limitations,
the Act was nevertheless "concerned with the content of such expres-
sion."68 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, reasoned that the
government's interest would be implicated only if a person treated the
flag in a way that communicated a message inconsistent with the ide-
als set out by Congress in the Act.69 Consequently, the Act could not
be justified without reference to the content of the actor's message.7°
Using strict scrutiny review, the Court held that the government's
asserted interest failed to justify an infringement on First Amendment
rights and declared the Act unconstitutional.71
unconstitutional regulation of protected speech.
64. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 314.
65. Id
66. Id. at 317 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)). See supra note 63.
67. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 315 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 316-17.
70. Id. at 317-18.
71. Id. at 318-19. The Court also declined to reassess its decision in Johnson. The
United States argued that the Act was passed in recognition of national opposition to flag
burning. But the Court said that the government cannot, consistent with the First Amend-
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B. Governmental Restrictions on Free Speech
Controversies over what speech the government may or may not
permissively regulate has led to the development of a confusing and
ever changing body of law. For the purposes of this Comment, Law-
rence H. Tribe's "two track" method72 provides the simplest and most
useful analysis. Since "track two" deals exclusively with content-neu-
tral regulations of speech, a thorough analysis of it is beyond the
scope of this Comment.73 Under Tribe's Track One category, the leg-
islation involved'restricts speech because of its content.74 Such restric-
tions are facially unconstitutional and are subject to the most exacting
scrutiny." Content based distinctions that also discriminate on the
basis of viewpoint are subject to the highest degree of scrutiny.76
These requirements have the purpose and effect of almost completely
barring the government from restricting speech because of its con-
tent or viewpoint. To defend such a regulation, the government must
show that the expression or speech involved falls into one of the.nar-
rowly defined categories of unprotected speech.7" If the government is
72. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 12 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
73. Briefly, regulations falling under this approach seek goals independent of the con-
tent of the message involved. However, the indirect result of the regulation is that the flow
of information or ideas is significantly restrained. Such content-neutral regulations must meet
the four-part test set out in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and are sub-
jected to a lessened degree of scrutiny as compared with its Track One counterpart. See
supra note 59. The Court usually employs a "balancing test" where the extent to which the
communicative activity is inhibited is balanced against the values, interests, and rights
served by the regulation's enforcement.
74. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, § 12-2, at 789. Tribe argues
that the two ways in which this can be done is where the government singles out such ac-
tions either "(a) because of the specific message or viewpoint such action expresses, or (b)
because of the effects produced by awareness of the information or ideas such actions im-
part." Id
75. Id § 12-3, at 798-99 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) and Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)).
76. ld at 800.
77. The word "government" is used in this section of this Comment to mean gov-
ernment at any level be it federal, state, county, local, etc.
78. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, § 12-3, at 836. See infra part
M.B.1.
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unsuccessful at demonstrating this, it must prove that the regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve the asserted interest in order for it to be sustained. 9
1. The Categorical Approach to Proscribable Speech
Court decisions in the 1800's and early 1900's concerning First
Amendment issues repeatedly ended in defeat for the challenger. Amer-
ican School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty ° was the only prewar
case in which the Court ruled in favor of the claimant on First
Amendment grounds.8 The American School of Magnetic Healing
was an organization that believed that the human mind was responsible
for sickness and that it could be used to treat, cure, and remedy such
sickness.82 The school solicited customers by sending advertisements
through the mail. In turn, the customers mailed their payments to the
school.
The postmaster felt that the School's practice was fraudulent and
refused to deliver any of its mail.83 Consequently, the school brought
suit. The Supreme Court held that the postmaster's actions were un-
constitutional." It reasoned that the mind's effect on treating illnesses
was indeterminable.8 5 Consequently, the postmaster did not have the
right to declare such belief fraudulent on the basis of a differing opin-
ion.8
6
Shortly thereafter, the Court began to take a more protective pos-
ture toward free speechY.8  The result was a categorical distinction be-
79. Id (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983)).
80. 187 U.S. 94 (1902).
81. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985) [hereinafter
TRIBE, CONSTIrUTIONAL CHOICES].
82. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. at 94.
83. Id. at 98.
84. Id at 110 (holding that it was unconstitutional to deprive the School of its prop-
erty on the basis of a belief that its opinions as to the effectiveness of mind healing were
fraudulent).
85. Id. at 104.
86. Id. at 110.
87. See generally TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES, supra note 81, at 190-92.
572 [Vol. 95:561
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tween classes of protected and unprotected speech, the latter of which
the government may regulate freely. Discussions of these different
categories follow.
(a) Dangerous Speech: The Clear and Present Danger
Doctrine
During the period just before World War I, Congress enacted the
Espionage Act of 191788 and the Sedition Act of 1918.89 Both en-
actments were in response to the domestic political unrest surrounding
the war.90 The enactments gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to
develop standards for approaching First Amendment issues at a time
when a more restrictive reading of the free speech guarantee was war-
ranted.91 In Schenck v. United States92 and Abrams v. United
States,93 the Court accepted this opportunity and introduced the "clear
and present danger" test.94
In both cases, the Court upheld espionage convictions based on
Justice Holmes' new theory. "The question in every case," he wrote,
"is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has the right to prevent."95
In Holmes' classic dissent in Abrams, he warned of the dangers of re-
stricting free speech even in times of war.96 He wrote that free trade
of ideas is essential to our open society because all speech competes
for acceptance into the "marketplace of ideas."97
88. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
89. Sedition Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553.
90. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1613, at 958
(4th ed. 1991).
91. IL
92. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
93. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
94. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 90, § 16.13, at 958.
95. 249 U.S. at 52. It was also in this case where Holmes gave his classic example
of unprotected speech: "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a panic." I&
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Holmes' theory went through many modifications during the next
several decades.98 In Dennis v. Unites States,9 the petitioners were
convicted for conspiring to overthrow the government." Chief Jus-
tice Vinson, writing for himself and three other Justices, used a clear
and present danger test decidedly different from Holmes' theory. He
refined the test by holding that as the seriousness of the danger in-
creased, the amount of clear and present danger needed to justify
government restriction on speech decreased."0 The clear and present
danger test was therefore transformed into a balancing test. It balanced
the seriousness of the danger against the competing interest in free
speech.
After the Dennis decision, the "clear and present danger" test
remained essentially dormant."° It was not revived until the Court
began to focus on protecting the unpopular advocacy of ideas.10 3
Brandenburg v. Ohio1°4 established the current test for dangerous
speech cases. In Brandenburg, the Ku Klux Klan held a rally which
was televised on local and national news programs."0 5 The rally con-
sisted of burning crosses, displaying weaponry, and speaking in a
derogatory manner about Jewish Americans and African Ameri-
cans.' °6 Brandenburg, the leader of the Ku Klux Klan, was quoted as
saying, "Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa,
98. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Hemdon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242 (1937) (the first time the "clear and present danger" test was relied on in a ma-
jority opinion); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). A similar line of cases which modified the clear and present
danger test includes Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (convictions for violating
the Smith Act were affirmed because the party's teachings advocated the speedy overthrow
of the government) and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (convictions of com-
munist party officials for conspiring to violently overthrow of the government were over-
turned).
100. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
101. Id. at 510.
102. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 90, § 16.14, at 966.
103. Id
104. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
105. Id at 445.
106. Id at 445-46.
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the Jew returned to Israel."' 0 7 He was charged and convicted under
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism statute for "[a]dvocating ... the duty,
necessity, or propriety of a crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful
methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or politi-
cal reform" and for "voluntarily [assembling] with any society, group,
or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of
criminal syndicalism."' 8
The Court ultimately struck down the statute.' °9 In doing so it
changed the "clear and present danger" doctrine substantially. The
Court held that advocacy of violence is protected by the First Amend-
ment, as long as it does not incite people to imminent action." 0
Brandenburg's new "clear and present danger test" thus requires states
to fulfill three elements before speech can be constitutionally abridged:
"(1) the speaker must have subjectively intended incitement; (2) in
context, the words used must have been likely to produce imminent
lawless action; and (3) the words used by the speaker must have ob-
jectively encouraged and urged incitement." ''
(b) Chaplinsky and the "Fighting Words" Doctrine
Fighting words represent another category of speech that the gov-
ernment may constitutionally restrict. The doctrine was originally intro-
duced by the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire."'
In Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who had called a city marshall a "goddamned racketeer" and
a "damned fascist" during an altercation in the street.' These words
were termed "fighting words."1 14 The Court defined fighting words
as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
107. I at 447.
108. Idt at 444.
109. I at 449.
110. Id. at 448.
Ill. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 90, § 16.15, at 968.
112. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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an immediate breach of the peace."' Words of this type were
deemed readily punishable because they involve "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest[s] in order and morality."'"6 The
Court assumed that such words would produce an uncontrollable im-
pulse to violence.1
7
The fighting words doctrine has been consistently narrowed since
its inception in Chaplinsky. In Terminiello v. Chicago,"" the Court
retreated from the Chaplinsky "uncontrollable impulse" test by ruling
that a statute which prohibited conduct that "stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a distur-
bance" was unconstitutional.1 9 The retreat is evident by the Court's
willingness to recognize that a certain amount of provocative and
challenging speech is protected.' 20 Terminiello's reasoning thus indi-
cated a shift from concentrating solely on the words themselves to
including an appraisal of the surrounding context.
Cohen v. California... represents an even narrower interpretation
of the fighting words doctrine. Cohen was prosecuted for entering a
courthouse wearing a jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" embla-
zoned on the back.'2 Justice Harlan, recognizing that "one man's
115. Id at 572.
116. Id.
117. See generally Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of the First
Amendment Protection, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8 n.36 (1974).
118. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
119. Id at 3. The case involved Terminiello's address inside an auditorium where he
denounced Jews and Blacks.
120. The Court stated:
A function of free speech ... is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its
high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative
and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea ... the alternative would
lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political
or community groups.
Id. at 4-5.
121. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
122. Id. at 16.
jrol. 95:561
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vulgarity is another's lyric"123 overturned the conviction. 24 So rul-
ing, the Court effectively limited the fighting words doctrine to in-
stances that involve direct personal insults.
Since the Cohen ruling, the viability of the Chaplinsky formula
has been left uncertain. Recent cases demonstrate that the Court does
not look favorably on prosecutions for fighting words violations." s
In fact, the Court often overturns fighting words convictions on over-
breadth and vagueness grounds seemingly to avoid directly overruling
Chaplinsky. 16 This is not to say that the fighting words doctrine is
essentially dead. It just means that the Court will carefully scrutinize
convictions under it. 27
(c) Obscenity, Libel, and Other Unprotected Expression
Obscenity and libel represent two additional categories of speech
which are not afforded complete constitutional protection. The Supreme
Court placed libelous speech outside the circle of constitutional protec-
tion in Beauharnais v. Illinois,12 1 while the Court determined that ob-
scenity was not fully protected speech in Miller v. California.29
123. Id. at 25.
124. Id,
125. See ROTUNDA Er AL., supra note 41, § 20.40, at 198.
126. Id, See also Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 518 (1974) (conviction for address-
ing policeman, "You goddamn motherfucking police" overturned because the statute was
overbroad and vague); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (conviction for addressing
policeman, "You son of a bitch I'll choke you to death," overturned because statute was
overbroad and vague). Justice Blackmun even complained in his dissent in Gooding that
"the Court, despite its protestations to the contrary, is merely playing lip service to
Chaplinsky." Gooding, 405 U.S. at 537.
127. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 41, § 20.40, at 198.
128. 343 U.S. 988 (1952) (for the defense of a criminal prosecution for libel to pre-
vail, the defendant must show not only that the utterance is true, but also that the publi-
cation was made with good motive and for justifiable ends). But see New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (held that, to recover for any alleged defamatory falsehood
relating to a public official's conduct, the defamatory statement must relate to the individual
plaintiff-government official. Criticism of the government in general could not be punished,
for that would constitute a seditious action; the plaintiff-government official has the burden
of proving the statement was false; the plaintiff-government official must also prove that the
defendant had made the false statements with malice).
129. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual
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Since the R.A. V. decision did not involve either classification, they are
beyond the scope of this Comment.
C. Overbreadth and Vagueness Challenges to Speech Restrictions
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines provide courts with two
ways of testing the validity of speech restrictions. These doctrines are
designed to ensure that a statute, while reaching unprotected speech,
does not also trample on protected speech. 130 In addition, they guard
against arbitrary and capricious enforcement of broadly-worded and
vague statutes.' This ensures that the due process requirement of
notice is fulfilled.13 1
A peculiar aspect of the overbreadth doctrine is that it provides an
exception to the ordinary requirement of standing. 3 3 While a statute
in question may be constitutional as applied, it may nevertheless be
challenged it on the grounds that it has the potential for violating the
constitutional rights of another. The reason for this exception is that if
an overbroad statute is left unchallenged, it may chill free speech by
deterring people from engaging in protected speech.
134
1. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The Court first addressed the overbreadth doctrine in Thornhill v.
Alabama.135 In Thornhill, the petitioner was convicted under an Ala-
bama statute which prohibited loitering and picketing a place of busi-
conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First
Amendment protection).
130. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (even if the state has the
power to regulate an area, the regulation "must be so exercised as not, in attaining a per-
missible end, unduly infringe the protected freedom.").
131. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (overbroad statute failed to
give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that the contemplated conduct was pro-
hibited; its broad wording may apply to innocent conduct; it encourages arbitrary arrests and
unlimited police discretion).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
134. TRiBE, CONSTrrTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, § 12-27, at 1022-24.
135. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
[Vol. 95:561
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/11
HATE CRIME LAWS
ness with the intention of "impeding, interfering with, or injuring such
business." 136 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States,
the petitioner challenged the statute as violative of his rights to free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press. 137 The Court found the
statute facially overbroad and overturned the conviction. 38 Justice
Murphy, writing for the Court, explained that while the statute banned
unprotected expression, it also reached peaceful picketing and other
potential activities protected by the First Amendment. 139
Recognizing the overbreadth doctrine as "strong medicine," the
Supreme Court placed qualifications on the doctrine in Broadrick v.
Oklahoma.' In Broadrick, the petitioners were charged by Oklaho-
ma State Personnel Board for violating a statute which prohibited civil
service employees from engaging in political activity.'' The petition-
ers challenged their convictions on the grounds that the Oklahoma stat-
ute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.' 42 The Court upheld
the statute, holding that when a statute is aimed at regulating conduct
as opposed to pure speech and the conduct has expressive content, the
statute's challenged overbreadth "must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."143
The Supreme Court further limited the potency of the overbreadth
doctrine by applying the "substantial overbreadth" requirement to stat-
utes affecting "pure speech" as well. In New York v. Ferber,1" the
owner of an adult bookstore was convicted under a New York statute
which prohibited the distribution of materials containing sexual depic-
tions of children under the age of sixteen.Y The Court applied the
136. Il at 92.
137. Id at 93-95.
138. Id at 97-98.
139. I
140. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
141. Id at 602. Civil service employees were not, however, prohibited from expressing
their opinions or voting. Id at 602-04 n.1.
142. Id at 602.
143. Id at 615.
144. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
145. Id at 749. In particular, the petitioner was arrested when he sold two films de-
picting young boys masturbating to an undercover police officer. Id at 751-52.
1992-931 579
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Broadrick rule'4 and held that the statute's "legitimate reach
dwarf[ed] its arguably impermissible applications," 147 and was there-
fore not "substantially overbroad."
48
2. The Void for Vagueness Doctrine
While the vagueness doctrine has many similarities to the over-
breadth doctrine,149 it is really quite distinct. A vague law does not
have to reach constitutionally protected speech to be declared void for
vagueness. 5 0 In contrast, an overbroad law does not have to lack
clarity or precision to be declared overbroad.151 A statute will be de-
clared void for vagueness when, as a matter of due process, persons
"of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the statute's] mean-
ing and differ as to its application."'15 2
The above principles have been used on thousands of occasions to
decide and equal number of different free speech issues. One of the
many issues left unanswered, however, was how these principles ap-
plied to laws punishing hate motivated crime. R.A. V.v. St. Paul sup-
plied the long-awaited answer.
IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION IN RA. V.
After briefly reciting the case's facts and history, Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, reminded the Court that it was bound by the
Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the ordinance at issue.' 53
Accordingly, the Court accepted the state supreme court's interpretation
that the ordinance reached only fighting words within the meaning of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. 54
146. Id at 766-74.
147. Id. at 773.
148. Id.
149. See infra part II.C.l.
150. See TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 72, § 12-31, at 1033.
151. Id
152. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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With that in mind, the Court proceeded to review the grounds on
which R.A.V., the petitioner, challenged the ordinance. 15 5 The peti-
tioner and his amiCi 156 urged the Court to modify the Chaplinsky for-
mula and declare the ordinance invalid for being "substantially
overbroad" within the meaning of Broadrick v. Oklahoma.157 In an
unusual move, however, the Court found it unnecessary to reach this
question presented. 151 While assuming that the narrowed interpreta-
tion was sufficient, the Court nonetheless found that the statute dis-
criminated against speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech
addressed, and was therefore facially unconstitutional. 159
A. Analysis of the Reasoning
Justice Scalia began his analysis by reviewing the First Amend-
ment principles at issue.' 6 He said that the First Amendment gener-
ally prohibited the government from restricting speech because the
government happens to disagree with the speaker's message.' 6' In a
statement strongly attacked by Justice Stevens, Scalia asserted that
155. 1L
156. Amicus Curiae briefs filed in support of R.A.V. include: Brief of Amicus Curiae
Patriot's Defense Foundation, Inc. In Support of the Appellant, R.A.V., R.A.V. v. St. Paul,
464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Brief of Center for Individu-
al Rights as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507
(Minn. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, and American Jewish Congress In Support
of Petitioner, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992).
157. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
158. Id. According to Justice White, the Court's move was unprecedented because the
ground on which the case was decided "was never presented to the Minnesota Supreme
Court ... has not been briefed by the parties before this Court ... [and] requires serious
departures from the teaching of prior cases." Ia at 2550-51. Justice White therefore felt that
the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case on the majority rationale. Ia In his opinion,
Justice Scalia countered Justice White's assertion by arguing that the ground on which the
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such content based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid.6 2
He quickly acceded, however, that there exists certain narrowly-defined
categories of speech in which the content may be regulated.1 63 These
categories contain messages that are of slight social value that any
benefit they may confer on society will be clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.164 But he maintained that this
categorical approach exists only in limited form, citing as authority
those cases since the 1960's that have consistently narrowed its
scope.1 65
Scalia then advanced a novel theory which is arguably unsupport-
ed by applicable precedent. He agreed that past decisions have stated
that the limited categories of constitutionally proscribable speech are
not afforded any First Amendment protection.1 66 But he argued that
these decisions were not considered to be absolute and that the cate-
gories of proscribable speech are not completely invisible to the
Constitution. 67 Instead, those past decisions must be read in context,
and "are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated short-
hand characterizing obscenity 'as not being speech at all'." 168He
contended that implicit within the meaning of those decisions is the
principle that the government may freely regulate the limited categories
of speech, but only on the basis of their constitutionally proscribable
content.1 69 However, the government cannot regulate these categories
if the restriction is based on a factor 'generally not permitted by the
First Amendment.1 7
0
As an illustration, the government may make the constitutionally
-permitted content distinction and ban libelous speech.71 But the gov-
ernment is prohibited from making a further determination and pro-
162. Id. at 2542 (emphasis added).
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scribing only that libel which is critical of the government.' 72 Such a
regulation would be impermissibly content based. This is because the
basis for making the further content distinction between permitted and
unpermitted libel (unpermitted being made up only of messages critical
of the government), is not constitutionally recognized as a basis for
which libel may be regulated.1 1
3
The majority feared that if the otherwise impermissible content
distinctions were allowed, it would be acceptable for the government
to use the categories of proscribable speech freely as vehicles for
impermissible content discrimination. 74 Thus, the government would
be capable of restricting speech it disagrees with simply by hiding the
content discrimination within one of the limited categories. The result
would be a permissible but realistically unconstitutional restriction on
free speech: 175 "but for" the category, the restriction would be uncon-
stitutional.
Having effectively narrowed the permissive use of the categories
of proscribable speech, Scalia proceeded to redefine "fighting words"
concept. 6 He explained that, contrary to past decisions, fighting
words are not totally void of expressive content.'7 Rather, there are
instances in which these words are quite expressive.'78 Consequently,
it cannot be held that fighting words are freely regulable and invisible
to the First Amendment. 7 9 In quoting from Chaplinsky, Scalia re-
marked, "We have not said that [fighting words] constitute 'no part of
the expression of ideas,' but only that they constitute 'no essential part
of any exposition of ideas'.' 80
Scalia's proposition is an attempt to avoid the cliche, "give him
an inch and he'll take a yard." In the first place, just because a par-









180. l1& at 2544.
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element (the inch), does not mean that the government may regulate t
hat speech on the basis of any feature it chooses, (the yard).' For
example, a person may be- punished for burning a flag under an ordi-
nance prohibiting outdoor fires. Such a regulation is divorced from any
message involved.1 82 But it is not permissible to punish that person
under an ordinance against dishonoring the flag."' That type of ordi-
nance would prohibit flag burning based on the content of the message
conveyed." 4
Similarly, the government's power to proscribe speech on the basis
of a content element, like obscenity, does not license the government
to proscribe freely that same speech on the basis of other content ele-
ments. 185 For example, an, ordinance prohibiting obscene photographs
of the most lewd and lascivious displays of sexual behavior is safe
from constitutional challenge. 86 The government cannot, however,
prohibit only that obscenity which includes offensive messages critical
of the government.1 8
7
In a confusing attempt to make this clearer, Scalia maintains that
the real reason why fighting words are excluded from First Amend-
ment protection i§ that their unprotected features are essentially
nonspeech elements of communication.188 In this way, fighting words
are analogous to what Scalia calls a "noisy sound truck."'8 9 Each
represents a means of communicating an idea, or a medium used to
express an idea." ° These nonspeech elements can be regulated with-
out the fear of possibly offending the First Amendment. 9' In con-
trast, the government cannot regulate the use of this means or medium
based on hostility or favoritism toward the content of the underlying
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-407 (1989)).
184. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
185. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2544.
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message conveyed.192 In this view, the First Amendment imposes a
"content discrimination" limitation upon a state's ability to suppress a
subclass of proscribable speech. 93
B. The Exceptions to the Rule
Recognizing the potentially broad applications of the "content
discrimination" limitation, Justice Scalia advanced a series of excep-
tions to his new rule. First, he submitted that the reason for prohibit-
ing regulations based, on content is to prevent the government from
driving certain viewpoints or ideas from the marketplace.94 If the
basis for the challenged content discrimination "consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable," then
there is no significant risk of this occurring. 9 5 This is because the
justification for placing the entire class beyond the reach of the First
Amendment has already been determined to be neutral enough to sup-
port the class' exclusion.1 96 Therefore, it may also form the basis for
making a narrower distinction within the class.-97
A second exception to the general rule against content discrimina-
tion arises in contexts where the content-defined subclass of
proscribable speech "happens to be associated with particular 'second-
ary effects'1 98 of the speech, so that the regulation is 'justified with-
out reference to the content of the ... speech'." 199 This exception is
designed to cover those instances where words may violate laws di-
rected against conduct and not against speech.2m
The best way of approaching this exception is by examining the





196. Id at 2545-46.
197. Id
198. Id at 2546.
199. Id (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
200. /-A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2546.
1992-93]
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Theatres,2 ' the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult
theaters from locating within a certain distance from any residential
zone, dwelling, church, or school.2' This ordinance clearly discrimi-
nated on the basis of the content of the subject matter shown at the
adult theater because it allowed other types of theaters free to freely
locate wherever their owners chose.2"3 The Court held, however, that
the purpose of the ordinance was to help eliminate the "secondary ef-
fects" such theaters may have on the surrounding community. 4
These secondary effects included the possibility of increased crime,
prostitution, and decreased property value. 5
As a final exception to the general rule, Justice Scalia provided a
"catchall" exclusion aimed -atattacking other content selective speech
regulations. If the government selectively regulates content within a
totally proscribable category of speech, the regulation can be validated
"so long as the nature of the content discrimination is such that there
is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot." °6 In other words; if there is no genuine threat that the gov-
ernment is attempting to censor a certain viewpoint to drive it from
the marketplace, then the regulation will sustain a First Amendment
challenge.20 7
C. Analysis of the Holding
In applying these novel principles to the St. Paul ordinance, the
Court ruled that, even assuming that the ordinance reached only fight-
ing words, it was still facially unconstitutional.2 8 The Minnesota Su-
201. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
202. 1a
203. Id. at 47.
204. Il at 52.
205. Id
206. R.A.V. at 2547.
207. IM. This does not ensure that the regulation will be constitutional. Such a regula-





West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/11
SHATE CRIME LAWS
preme Court's narrowed interpretation adequately defined the terms
"arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others."2' The remaining
terms, however, clearly applied only to those fighting words that in-
sulted or provoked violence "on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or gender."21° The Court maintained that the First Amendment
forbids the government from imposing special prohibitions on those
speakers who wish to express their views on subjects that the govern-
ment chooses to label as "disfavored."
21
'
The statute was also fatally flawed in that it went beyond content
discrimination and discriminated on the basis of the speaker's view-
point.2 2 The ordinance had in effect licensed one side of the debate
to fight freely while requiring the disfavored side to follow strict pro-
hibitory rules.213 The Court explained that while displays containing
odious racial epithets were prohibited to proponents of all views, fight-
ing words that did not in themselves invoke race, color, creed, reli-
gion, or gender would be usable at will by those arguing in favor of
one of the disfavored subjects.214 In other words, "One could hold up
a sign saying ... all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not
that all 'papists' are, for that would insult and provoke violence 'on
the basis of religion.'
215
It is important to note that St. Paul's ordinance did not prohibit
fighting words that were directed at certain persons or groups.216
This type of ordinance would be constitutional if it met the require-
ments of the Equal Protection Clause.21 7 Instead, it prohibited the use
of fighting words based on the content of the speaker's message. This
particular content involved expressions of bias-motivated hatred. 21 8 St.




212. Id at 2547-48.
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was necessary because it provided reassurance to minority groups that
have historically been discriminated against that such expression was
not condoned by the majority.219 The purpose of the First Amend-
ment, however, is to protect divergent viewpoints from being censored
by majority preferences." After all, offensive speech is at the heart
of the First Amendment because no one tries to censor nice speech.
Therefore, St. Paul must attempt to meet its goal in a way that does
not silence speech on the basis of the content or viewpoint of the mes-
sage involved.221
After finding that the ordinance did not fit into any of the three
exceptions 222 the Court considered whether it could still be upheld
under strict scrutiny analysis.2' St. Paul argued that the ordinance
was justified since it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.22 The City asserted that its interest was in securing the ba-
sic human rights of members of minority groups who have been his-
torically the subjects of discrimination. 225 This interest included the
right of these members to live in peace wherever they choose."6
The Court agreed that St. Paul's interests were compelling inter-
ests and that the ordinance did address them. 7 But it explained that
a content-based regulation is a dangerous weapon only to be used
where it is reasonably necessary to serve the asserted interest."8 If
adequate content-neutral alternatives are available, any defense of a
content-based regulation on compelling state interest grounds is signif-
icantly undercut.2 9 Scalia concluded that an ordinance not limited to











229. Id at 2549-50.
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ficial result.230 Therefore, the content-based version was not reason-
ably necessary, and the ordinance failed strict scrutiny analysis. 31
The way in which Scalia applied strict scrutiny is suspect. Nor-
mally, a statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate com-
pelling interest in order to survive strict scrutiny review.32 Here
Scalia argued that since the result reached by the content-based ordi-
nance can also be attained by banning a wider category of content-
neutral speech, the content based regulation is invalid .33 At first
glance, this appears to renounce strict scrutiny analysis. 2
34
There is a novel but rational interpretation of Scalia's seemingly
invalid approach to strict scrutiny. It appears that Scalia is contending
that a narrowly-drawn, content-based restriction on speech could never
survive a First Amendment challenge as long as adequate content-neu-
tral alternatives are available.235 This is because the danger of cen-
sorship created by a facially content-discriminatory statute is signifi-
cantly greater than the danger of censorship created by a content-neu-
tral alternative. 236 Therefore, it can be argued that a content-neutral
alternative actually has the effect of banning less speech because the
result of this alternative is not as drastic. It will not, for example, have
the force of completely censoring divergent ideas or viewpoints.
If that rationale seems unlikely, there is a doctrinal explanation as
well. Justice Scalia appears to treat strict scrutiny as a well-defined,
multi-element test. First, the state must show a legitimate compelling
interest.237 Second, the state must prove that the ordinance promotes
such interest.238 Third, the state must show that the content-based
version is reasonably necessary to promote the interest considering the
availability of adequate content-neutral alternatives.239 Finally, the
230. let at 2550.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2549-50.
233. 1d at 2550.
234. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
235. RA.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2550.
236. Id. at 2549-50.
237. I1&
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state must prove that the statute is the least restrictive means of pro-
moting the asserted interest. The St. Paul ordinance passed parts one
and two of the test.2' Its fatal flaw was that it failed part three. The
content-based version was simply not necessary.2"
In a concluding remark, the majority summarized their position in
two simple, but quite powerful, sentences: "Let there be no mistake
about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is repre-
hensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent
such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire. ''1 2
V. SUMMARY OF THE CONCURRENCES
Three of the four concurring Justices wrote blistering opinions
charging the majority with disrupting settled First Amendment law.
Justice Stevens even declared that Justice Scalia's unworkable theory
set First Amendment law' on its head. Despite their splintered ap-
proaches, the concurring Justices all agreed, however, that the St. Paul
ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad.
A. Justice White's Concurring Opinion
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, attacked the majority for
abolishing settled First Amendment principles. He argued that the
theory on which the majority based its decision is unworkable and
likely to do little more than confuse the lower courts. 3 First, Justice
White criticized the majority for eliminating the Chaplinsky categorical
approach.2" He asserted that the government should be free to draw
any distinction within the fighting words class because the Court has
consistently held that fighting words do not deserve constitutional
240. Id. at 2549.
241. Id at 2550.
242. Id.
243. Id at 2558.
244. Id at 2552.
[Vol. 95:561
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protection.245 Therefore, Justice Scalia's statement that fighting words
are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution"246 is contrary to the
weight of authority.4 7
Second, Justice White condemned the majority for renouncing
strict scrutiny review. He argued that the St. Paul ordinance would
have survived under traditional strict scrutiny because the ordinance
was narrowly tailored to serve the city's compelling interest.24s The
majority struck the ordinance down, however, because a ban on a
wider category of content-neutral speech would have had the same
result.249 Such a ban in effect requires states to legislate for problems
that do not confront them.25'
Finally, after criticizing the majority for striving to patch up its
unworkable theory with a series of ad hoc exceptions,251 Justice
White expressed his regret that the majority chose this case to rewrite
First Amendment law.252 In his view, the case could have been de-
cided using settled First Amendment principles.253 He believed that
even as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the ordinance
was fatally overbroad.2
Justice White submitted that the state supreme court sufficiently
limited the reach of the ordinance to fighting words. 5 Nevertheless
the state court failed to articulate the particular injuries St. Paul sought
to prevent.256 Drawing on the state supreme court's narrowed inter-
pretation, Justice White understood the court to have ruled that St.
Paul may prohibit expression that "by its very utterance [causes] anger,
245. Id
246. Id at 2543.
247. Id. at 2552.
248. Id at 2554.
249. Id
250. Id at 2555.
251. Id at 2556.
252. Id. at 2558.
253. Id
254. Id at 2560.
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alarm, or resentment." 7 He explained that prior cases have held that
expressive activity is not stripped of its constitutional protection just
because it causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment.z5 Since the
St. Paul ordinance made such expression criminal, it was clearly
overbroad on its face.2 9
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
Justice Blacknun, while joining in Justice White's opinion, wrote
a short opinion which in most respects mirrored Justice White's con-
cerns. He also appeared to reprimand Justice Scalia for concocting a
theory just to root out political correctness.2' 6 In this respect, the
majority's opinion seems to have been written in the direction of at-
tacking campus speech codes.
257. Id at 2559.
258. Id at 2559-60.
259. Id. at 2560.
260. Id. at 2560-61. This argument has some merit. At the oral argument in front of
the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia posed the following questions to Thomas J. Foley, the
Ramsey County Attorney who argued the case for the city:
Scalia: Obscenity is unprotected speech. Could an ordinance provide that you can't
use obscenity to advertise the Republican Party? Or if your object is to prohibit obscenity,
shouldn't you regulate obscenity?
Foley: Racial violence is especially harmful.
Scalia: That's a political judgment.
Foley: The city is attempting to fashion a response to violence that must be prohib-
ited.
Scalia: You could just drop the "race, color, gender, creed" from the ordinance.
In another portion of the proceeding Scalia inquired:
Scalia: Suppose a cross is burned on the grounds of a home for the mentally ill,
along with a sign saying "Mentally Ill Out!" It wouldn't be covered, would it? (suggesting
that "it's the wrong kind of bias.")
Foley: It probably wouldn't be addressed by the hate crimes ordinance, but other
laws would apply.
Scalia: But if public peace is the concern, then why is it permissible for the city to
discriminate as to the content?
Foley: The city is attempting to get at as many types of relevant conduct as it can.
Scalia: It would be easy to draft a statute to do so; just drop the "race, color,
creed, gender" language.
Court Hears Argument on Limits of First Amendment's Protection of Hate-Crimes, U.S.L.W.,
Dec. 12, 1991 (daily ed.).
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C. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens also agreed that the St. Paul ordinance was un-
constitutionally overbroad.261 He disagreed, however, with Justice
White's support of the categorical approach to fighting words.2 2 He
asserted that past decisions have formed a more complex analysis that
considers not only the content of the speech, but also the context and
the nature and scope of the restriction.2 63 But Justice Stevens' big-
gest difficulty was with accepting the majority's statement that content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.264 He argued that the en-
tire First Amendment jurisprudence has created a regime that is based
on the content of speech.2 s Whether an instance of speech falls
within one of the categories of unprotected speech is determined in
part by its content.2' Therefore, while the majority's theory "has
simplistic appeal, [it] lacks support in our First Amendment jurispru-
dence.
267
It is obvious that each of the concurring Justices feared the po-
tential negative impact of the majority's new First Amendment theory.
Surprisingly, the most conservative Justices joined in Justice Scalia's
theory and were willing to take this controversial step in First
Amendment jurisprudence. The decision's effect on current laws de-
pends on whether it will serve as precedent for future cases, or
whether it will be viewed as an aberration and an example of how
hard cases make bad law.
VI. EFFEcTs ON CURRENT LAW
At this point, the broad wording of the RA.V. opinion provides
little practical guidance for the future. The splintered approaches
261. Id. at 2571.
262. Id. at 2566.
263. I1&
264. I& at 2562.
265. Id. at 2563.
266. Id.
267. I& at 2566.
1992-93]
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among the Justices are likely to spur more lawsuits over hate crime
laws, over campus speech codes, and probably over the other catego-
ries of proscribable speech.268 It is quite possible that no hate crime
legislation will be capable of surviving a First Amendment challenge.
The Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) has developed
a model hate crime code.269 Its model code punishes bias motivated
criminal activity more severely than ordinary criminal activity.2 0 For
example, an assault proven to have been motivated by bias would
received a stiffer sentence than an ordinary assault. Therefore, bigoted
talk becomes evidence of a biased motive only after the assault is
committed. The ADL feels confident that despite the Court's ruling in
RA.V., its model code will survive a First Amendment challenge.271
This is because the aim of the code is not to punish the bigoted
thought, but to deter the commission of hate crimes.272 This confi-
dence, however, has recently been eroded. At least two of the twenty-
nine states273 that currently have hate crime legislation based on the
ADL model have declared their hate laws unconstitutional.27
268. See, e.g., Citizens United for Free Speech I v. Long Beach Township Bd. of
Comm'rs, 802 F. Supp. 1223 (D.NJ. 1992) (injunction against enforcement of a statute was
granted because R/A.V "demonstrates that commercial speech cannot be subjected to a con-
tent-based restrictions unless the restrictions are necessary to serve a compelling governmen-
tal interest.").
269. The ADL model statute provides:
A. A person commits the crime of intimidation if, by reason of the actual or
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another or
group of individuals, he violates Section .. _ of the Penal Code [insert code pro-
vision for criminal trespass, criminal mischief; harassment, menacing, assault and/or
any other appropriate statutorily proscribed criminal conduct].
B. Intimidation is a LI misdemeanor/felony [the degree of criminal liability
should be made contingent upon the severity of the injury incurred or the property
lost or damaged].
Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Words Can Increase Your Sen-
tence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REV.
333, 344 (1991).
270. William Grady, Hate-Crime Laws Collide Head-on with Free Speech, CHI. TRIB.,




274. But see Oregon v. Plowman, 858 P.2d 558 (Or.1992) (Oregon Supreme Court re-
fused to find unconstitutional a statute based on the ADL model. The statute made it a
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol95/iss2/11
HATE CRIME LAWS
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell,275 a group of African Americans bru-
tally beat a white youth after viewing the movie "Mississippi Burn-
ing."276 They were prosecuted under a hate crime law which was
based on the ADL model.2' The Wisconsin statute provided en-
hanced sentences for ordinary criminal conduct if that conduct was
motivated by racial, religious, ethnic, gender, or other bias.278 The
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the statute the day after the
United States Supreme Court released its decision in RA.V. 279 It held
that the statute violated the First Amendment by directly punishing
more severely what the legislature believed to be offensive
thought.2 0 It also offended the First Amendment indirectly by chill-
ing free speech.
281
The Ohio Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in Ohio
v. Wyant. 2 Wyant represented a consolidation of several cases in-
volving convictions for violations of the Ohio ethnic intimidation
law. 3 This law was also based on the ADL model.m4 The court
explained that a law which increases the penalty for bias motivated
crimes penalizes more than the crime itself.' The only difference
between a bias motivated assault and an ordinary assault is the bigoted
thought involved. Therefore, the statute's effect is to create "thought
crine," which clearly violates the First Amendment.286
On the federal level, similar hate crime legislation has been intro-
duced by the United States Congress. On April 7, 1992, Representative
crime for two or more people to injure another "because of their perception of that person's
race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. The court expressly disagreed
with the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, and agreed with
ADL's rationale for the constitutionality of its model code).
275. 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992).
276. Id at 809.
277. Id. at 812.
278. Id at 809.
279. Id at 811.
280. Id at 812-15.
281. Id. at 815.
282. 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992).
283. Id at 450-51.
284. Id. at 452-53.
285. Id at 453.
286. Id. at 459.
1992-931
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Charles E. Schumer from New York unveiled the Hate Crimes Sen-
tencing Enhancement Act of 1992.2" This bill directs the United
States Sentencing Commission to enhance the sentences for federal
hate crimes by at least three offense levels.28 Currently, the bill is
being debated before the House Judiciary Subcommittee. 2 9
The RA.V. decision has also had its effect on campus speech
codes. At least one university, the University of Wisconsin, has re-
ported repealing its code as a result of the increased litigation con-
cerning hate crime. 29° The University of Wisconsin's speech code
permitted the university to discipline students who made comments that
were demeaning to an individual's race, religion, or sexual orienta-
tion.291 The code also subjected a student to discipline for creating
an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment for education. 21
The Board of Regents repealed the code because it feared the code
violated students' freedom of speech.293
The above illustrations show that after only a few short months
since the Supreme Court's decision in RA.V., the new theory has
already had an adverse impact on attempts to punish hate crime. While
the RA.V. case dealt primarily with the fighting words category of
proscribable speech, it seems almost inevitable that the courts will
stretch the decision to reach other areas of proscribable speech as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
The dramatically differing opinions represented by the majority
and concurrences in RA.Y are symptomatic of a court wrestling with
an issue over which public opinion is extremely divided. The ruling in
RA.V even prompted an unusual split between organizations that are
287. H.R. 4797, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
288. Id,
289. Congress Considers Hate Crime Punishments, States News Service, July 29, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
290. Regents Repeal Hate Speech Rule, Proprietary to the United Press Int'l, Sept. 11,
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normally allies.29 For example, the American Jewish Congress was
delighted with the ruling, while the ADL called it troubling.295 In ad-
dition, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) represented Robert
A. Viktora in challenging the St. Paul ordinance. However, the Ameri-
can Way, a usual ACLU ally, believed that the hate crime law should
be upheld.296
The Justices were obviously split over an issue which plagues the
debate over hate crime legislation in general. That issue is whether it
is constitutionally permissible for a legislature to make an essentially
political judgment and declare that some insults are worse than others
and therefore deserve special punishment. It is difficult to draw a line
between instances where individual rights supersede societal interests
and those instances where individual rights should be subordinated.
The dramatic increase in hate crime and its effect on society as a
whole should have placed this line closer to the latter.
Whether the decision is welcomed depends on which side of the
controversy a person belongs. Some civil libertarians were pleased that
the First Amendment finally received a "breath of fresh air."297 Oth-
ers believed that the ruling provided a substantial roadblock to current
efforts at ridding the nation of bias-motivated hatred.2 98  The
decision's exact breath and precedential value is forthcoming. The
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.299 This case will
provide the answer to at least one important question Justice Scalia left
unanswered in R.A.V: whether laws that provide enhanced sentences
for bias-motivated laws are also unconstitutional in light of Court's
decision in RA.Y The answer will give states and universities across
the nation helpful guidelines to use in battling hate crime. Until then,
294. David G. Savage, Hate Crime Law is Struck Down; Supreme Court: Justices Rule
that a Minnesota Statute Infringes on Free Speech by Punishing Those Who Burn Crosses,
Paint Swastikas or otherwise Display Bigotry, L.A. TIMEs, June 23, 1992, at AS.
295. l
296. Id
297. St. Paul Family Puzzled by Ruling; Many States' Laws May Remain Valid, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION, June 23, 1992, at A4.
298. Grady, supra note 270, at C1.
299. 61 U.S.L.W. 3431 (Dec. 15, 1992).
1992-931
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the expansive and ambiguous decision in RA.V. v. St. Paul is the only
available standard.
In conclusion, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court
did not lose its morality and sense of decency when it decidedRA. V.
It cannot be stressed enough that the Court did not declare it legal to
burn a cross in an African American family's yard, or anyone else's
yard for that matter. Nor did it condone such reprehensible behavior.
The Supreme Court simply said that in governmental attempts to rid
the United States of bias-motivated crime, it is unconstitutional to use
censorship as the means of silencing the savage beast.
Joseph E. Starkey, Jr.
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